Costa Rica | 2026 Elections: Candidates’ Financial Proposals

Our lawyers in Costa Rica, experts in Banking and Finance, share this article on a comparative legal analysis of the main Banking and Finance proposals put forward by the leading presidential candidates in Costa Rica’s 2026 elections.

The 2026 presidential elections will not only determine the party that will govern Costa Rica, but will also influence the individuals who will lead the institutions responsible for defining the country’s monetary and economic policy. In a context of macroeconomic uncertainty, exchange rate pressures, and increasing demands for access to credit, the banking and financial sector has positioned itself as one of the central issues on the public agenda and within the electoral debate. At present, the Costa Rican banking system is composed of fifteen entities, distributed across three main categories: two state-owned commercial banks, two banks created by special laws, and eleven private banks1.

Accordingly, within the framework of the 2026 electoral process and in anticipation of the national elections to be held on Sunday, February 1st, the Banking and Finance proposals advanced by the different presidential candidates acquire relevance. These proposals not only anticipate potential changes to the country’s economic and financial policy, but also allow for an assessment of the degree of continuity or rupture with the current institutional model, as well as the risks and opportunities associated with potential reforms.

Under this premise, this article proposes an analysis aimed at examining the principal public policy proposals contained in the government plans of the most electorally competitive candidates. The selection of the candidates was based on the results of the Public Opinion Survey Report prepared by CIEP (Center for Research and Political Studies) of the University of Costa Rica, published on Wednesday, January 21st, 2026, identifying the three leading candidates in that survey. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on the proposals put forward by: 1) Laura Fernández Delgado of the "Partido Pueblo Soberano”; 2) Álvaro Ramos Chaves of "Partido Liberación Nacional”; and (3) Claudia Dobles Camargo of the "Coalición Agenda Ciudadana”.

To ensure comparability among the proposals analyzed, the following evaluation criteria were defined: i) consistency with the existing constitutional and legal framework; ii) legal and institutional feasibility of the proposed reforms; and, iii) the potential impact of each proposal and its foreseeable effects in relation to the intended objective. These criteria are intended to assess the legality, feasibility, and impact of the electoral promises set out in the roadmaps of the potential governments of each candidacy.

Based on the foregoing, the study is organized around two thematic axes common to the government plans analyzed: 1) Monetary Policy and the Role of the Central Bank of Costa Rica; and, 2) Development Banking and Productive Financing.

AXIS 1: Monetary Policy and the Role of the Central Bank of Costa Rica

The Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR or Central Bank) is an autonomous public law institution that serves as the country’s monetary authority. Pursuant to its Organic Law, the BCCR’s primary objectives are to maintain the internal and external stability of the national currency and to ensure its convertibility into other currencies. As subsidiary objectives, the law also assigns the following: (a) promoting the orderly development of the Costa Rican economy in order to achieve full utilization of the Nation’s productive resources, while seeking to prevent or mitigate inflationary or deflationary trends that may arise in the monetary and credit market; (b) ensuring the proper use of the Nation’s international monetary reserves to achieve overall economic stability; (c) promoting the efficiency of domestic and external payment systems and maintaining their normal operation; and (d) fostering a stable, efficient, and competitive financial intermediation system.

Internal stability translates operationally into maintaining low and stable inflation. External stability has been interpreted by the Central Bank itself as the country’s capacity to meet its external obligations, thereby avoiding balance-of-payments crises. Finally, currency convertibility manifests in practice through the absence of restrictions on foreign currency transactions within national territory.

To achieve these objectives, the BCCR conducts monetary policy primarily through two instruments: the legal minimum reserve requirement and interest rate management. The legal minimum reserve requirement refers to the mandatory reserve that financial institutions must maintain at the Central Bank, proportional to their deposits and funding, and serves as a liquidity control mechanism; through this instrument, the BCCR regulates the amount of money in circulation.

Within this framework, the BCCR operates under an inflation-targeting regime, with a managed floating exchange rate system and technical autonomy designed as a safeguard against short-term political pressures.

The government plan of Laura Fernández includes five proposals related to the role of the Central Bank and monetary policy, which can be grouped into three categories: i) reaffirmation of the existing framework, ii) targeted legal reforms, and, iii) proposals with potential institutional impact.

"Guarantee the independence of the Central Bank of Costa Rica in the management of national monetary policy, ensuring low inflation levels.”

"Maintain an exchange rate balanced by economic conditions, without excessive State intervention in the supply and demand of foreign currency.”

First, the proposals aimed at guaranteeing the independence of the Central Bank to ensure low inflation and promoting an exchange rate determined by economic conditions without excessive State intervention do not entail legal reforms. The autonomy of the BCCR is already guaranteed under the existing legal framework, and the managed floating regime has been formally in place since 2015. From a strictly legal perspective, these proposals are declarative in nature and reflect a continuity-based stance with respect to the current model.

"Promote regulations that enable and authorize the payment of tax obligations, social security contributions, and other obligations to public institutions in U.S. dollars by individuals and legal entities.”

Currently, the general principle is that tax obligations are assessed and paid in colones, except for specific cases provided by law. Implementing this measure would require an express legal authorization recognizing the U.S. dollar as having discharging power vis-à-vis the State. This initiative is linked to the bill processed under legislative file No. 24,877 and presents high legal feasibility.

"Promote the use of the State’s own foreign exchange resources as an alternative source of financing for debt repayment.”

Third, the proposal to use the State’s own foreign exchange resources as an alternative source for servicing public debt raises more significant legal concerns. To the extent that such resources correspond to reserves administered by the BCCR, any mechanism enabling their use to meet public sector obligations would imply a substantial amendment to the Organic Law of the Central Bank. In this regard, the proposal affects the autonomy currently enjoyed by the BCCR, its primary objective of maintaining economic stability, and the prohibition against Central Bank financing of the government or public institutions. Consequently, the proposal generates significant legal tensions and runs counter to the global practice -since the 1990s- of separating monetary policy from fiscal policy.

"Promote the development of mechanisms to protect companies, institutions, and families from exchange rate risk through instruments such as swaps or forwards.”

The use of such instruments is lawful and mitigates exchange rate risk; a proper promotion that deepens the existing legal framework constitutes an excellent measure.

From a legal standpoint, the candidate’s proposals combine continuity-based elements with targeted legal reforms and high-impact initiatives. While some initiatives reinforce or promote the existing legal framework without requiring substantial regulatory changes, others would require express legal authorization, and at least one would entail a substantive reform affecting the Central Bank’s institutional model.Any proposal intended to enable the BCCR to finance the public sector must be assessed with special caution, given its potential economic impact and the legal analysis required for a cross-cutting reform that approaches the constitutional autonomy enjoyed by State-owned banks. Finally, the proposal regarding hedging instruments requires clarification as to which actor bears the exchange rate risk, in order to avoid distortions or volatility in the foreign exchange market.

Álvaro Ramos’ government plan presents a single proposal concerning monetary policy and the role of the Central Bank; although it has a wide scope.

"In the monetary axis, we will reformulate the objectives of the Central Bank of Costa Rica so that it adopts a dual mandate of inflation control and maximization of the use of the country’s productive resources. We will take measures to eliminate exchange rate bias. Review of legal minimum reserve requirements. We will promote a reserve purchase program.”

The core of the proposal lies in reformulating the objectives of the Central Bank to adopt a dual mandate aimed at both inflation control and maximizing the use of productive resources. From a legal perspective, this proposal cannot be implemented through administrative decisions or executive directives; it necessarily requires an amendment to the Organic Law of the Central Bank of Costa Rica.

As noted earlier, Article 2 of that law establishes as the BCCR’s primary objectives the maintenance of internal and external currency stability and its convertibility, relegating employment promotion and productive development to subsidiary objectives. Introducing a dual mandate would require modifying this normative hierarchy, elevating full utilization of productive resources -and, by extension, employment- to the status of a primary objective, on equal footing with price stability.

This change would entail a reconfiguration of the Central Bank’s institutional model, as it would alter the guiding criterion for monetary policy decision-making. From an economic standpoint, there is broad debate regarding the suitability of this framework. Among the practical critiques is the assertion that a dual mandate may not be appropriate for small, open economies, as scenarios may arise in which price stability and full employment objectives conflict, forcing the Central Bank to prioritize one over the other. Nevertheless, the adoption of a dual mandate is not foreign to international practice; highly credible central banks -such as the U.S. Federal Reserve- operate under such a framework. Its institutional and macroeconomic viability requires deeper analysis of its systemic effects.

The proposal to eliminate the so-called "exchange rate bias” and to promote a program for the purchase of international reserves falls within the BCCR’s ordinary powers in exchange rate policy and reserve management. From a legal standpoint, these measures do not require legal reforms. However, they are powers of the Central Bank’s Board of Directors and cannot be influenced by the Executive Branch; any such interference would be unlawful.

The concept of "exchange rate bias” refers to a critique of exchange rate behavior, particularly the perception that monetary and exchange rate policy has structurally favored an appreciated colón, negatively impacting tradable productive sectors. From a legal perspective, this observation does not in itself imply illegality or an intrinsic regulatory deviation. The exchange rate is, in essence, the price of a currency -such as the U.S. dollar or the euro- expressed in colones, and its determination falls within the Central Bank’s remit under the prevailing exchange rate regime.

Finally, the Central Bank already purchases and maintains foreign currency reserves.

From a legal perspective, Álvaro Ramos’ proposal combines instruments fully compatible with the existing framework with a high-impact structural reform: the adoption of a dual mandate for the Central Bank. The most relevant aspect is the reformulation of the BCCR’s objectives, as it requires an express amendment to its Organic Law and a rethinking of productive objectives. The proposal is legally viable, as it does not conflict with constitutional principles and would be implemented through legislative reform; however, even if lawful, it entails a profound transformation of Costa Rica’s central banking model that warrants careful analysis. The only legal tension identified concerns the review of legal minimum reserve requirements, which are determined by the BCCR; while a review is possible, direct Executive intervention would be unlawful.

The proposals in Claudia Dobles’ government plan regarding monetary policy and the role of the Central Bank of Costa Rica are characterized by a combination of continuity-based approaches aligned with the existing legal framework and proposals for institutional innovation focused primarily on exchange rate management and financial market development.

"Price stability and full employment. Guarantee the autonomy of the Central Bank as the guiding principle of monetary policy, ensuring its commitment to maintaining low and stable inflation, an indispensable condition for macroeconomic stability. At the same time, monetary policy must consider impacts on employment and productive sectors, so that decisions on interest rates and liquidity contribute not only to price stability but also to economic dynamism. The objective is to achieve a sustainable balance between stability and growth, strengthening confidence in the financial system, fostering productive investment, and ensuring conditions conducive to the generation of quality employment.”

First, the reference to price stability and full employment as objectives of monetary policy introduces no legal novelties; moreover, the autonomy of the Central Bank of Costa Rica does not depend on the will of the Executive Branch. Likewise, maintaining low and stable inflation constitutes the BCCR’s primary objective, while promoting productive development and employment forms part of its subsidiary objectives. Accordingly, this proposal substantively reproduces the content of Article 2 of the BCCR’s Organic Law, without proposing normative amendments or changes to the hierarchy of institutional objectives.

"Increase the capacities of the Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPS) to manage its foreign exchange needs independently. Establish operational and organizational capacity guidelines to allow each NFPS institution to negotiate its foreign exchange needs directly in the interbank foreign exchange market (MONEX) and reduce dependence on the BCCR. Develop negotiation capabilities in the forward foreign exchange market through the formulation of forward currency contracts.”

Second, the proposal to strengthen the NFPS’s capacity to directly manage its foreign exchange needs raises legal questions. Allowing NFPS institutions to negotiate directly in the interbank foreign exchange market (MONEX) and in forward markets could be implemented within the current legal framework, subject to legal reform, provided that clear operational guidelines are defined and the BCCR’s role as exchange rate authority is respected to avoid illegality. Under the current framework, in which the Central Bank acts as intermediary and gradually manages the accumulation and provision of foreign currency, it performs a stabilizing function that would be partially displaced by this proposal.

"Management of reserve assets by the Ministry of Finance. Allow the Ministry of Finance to hold deposits in the international financial system to improve treasury management derived from international obligations. This task must be coordinated with the external stability objective established in the BCCR’s Organic Law, as well as the coordination objective set forth in the Public Financial Administration Law.”

Third, the proposal to allow the Ministry of Finance to manage reserve assets through deposits in the international financial system constitutes a novel initiative. From a legal standpoint, this proposal requires particularly rigorous analysis, as the administration of international reserves is closely tied to the external stability objectives assigned to the BCCR by its Organic Law and to its autonomy, in order to avoid constitutional tensions. Any scheme enabling the Ministry of Finance to manage reserve assets must be carefully articulated within the coordination framework provided by the Public Financial Administration Law and cannot result, directly or indirectly, in fragmentation of international reserve management. In the absence of further details, the proposal raises questions regarding its institutional coherence, constitutionality, and impact on the Central Bank’s functional autonomy.

"Creation of an organized foreign exchange futures market at the National Stock Exchange (BNV). Coordinate with the BNV to organize a standardized futures market in Costa Rica, define standardized foreign exchange and interest rate futures contract specifications, and foster the emergence of market makers for futures contracts. Additionally, allow commercial banks to participate as market makers in the system organized by the BNV and create a central clearing house for the futures market.”

Finally, the proposal to create an organized foreign exchange and interest rate futures market at the National Stock Exchange represents a technically valuable initiative, similar to Fernández’s promotion of swaps. From a legal standpoint, this measure is fully compatible with the existing securities market regulatory framework.

From an overall legal assessment, Claudia Dobles’ proposals combine a continuity-based approach to the Central Bank’s mandate with initiatives for financial and operational innovation in exchange rate matters. While the former merely reaffirms the existing framework, the latter requires careful institutional design and gradual implementation to avoid tensions with the BCCR’s role—particularly its autonomy—since any weakening thereof would generate constitutional tensions and could be unlawful. In this sense, the plan places less emphasis on redefining the central banking model and more on expanding the instruments available for managing exchange rate risk and deepening the financial market.

AXIS 2: Development Banking and Productive Financing

The Development Banking System (SBD) is a mechanism designed to finance and promote productive, viable projects aligned with the country’s development model, particularly in terms of social mobility. It is not a bank, but rather a State policy aimed at generating a supply of business credit primarily oriented toward Micro, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises (MSMEs). It operates through a system of different entities -financial operators- responsible for channeling resources. The SBD operates through three funds: (i) the National Development Fund (FONADE); (ii) the Development Financing Fund (FOFIDE); and (iii) the Development Credit Fund (FCD). FONADE resources come from public budgets and other trusts. FOFIDE is composed of 5% of the annual net profits of state-owned banks, managed by each bank. The third fund, FCD, known as the "banking toll,” consists of funds that private banks must allocate to financing MSME credit operations; there are two modalities: if the private bank chooses to place the funds directly, it must have a specialized structure to channel them (allocating 10% to the SBD); if it opts not to do so, it must deposit 17% with a state-owned bank, which then places the resources.

Beneficiaries may offer mortgage, pledge, or trust guarantees. If sufficient collateral is unavailable, the bank processing the credit application may resort to FONADE’s Guarantee and Surety Fund. The maximum guaranteed amount is up to 75% per beneficiary, with a cap of CRC 65 million.

Laura Fernández’s government plan makes only a brief reference to the SBD, characterized by a high level of generality and the absence of concrete normative or institutional definitions.

"Improve conditions, access, and support for resources from the Development Banking System to finance sector modernization and the application of technologies that enable a more competitive industry, ensuring that the resources provided translate into production improvements.”

From a legal standpoint, this proposal introduces no identifiable legal or regulatory reforms. The emphasis on translating resources into production improvements is desirable but lacks normative content. The SBD is already legally designed to finance productive activities and promote financial inclusion; therefore, without defining new instruments, incentives, impact evaluation mechanisms, or accountability schemes, the proposal does not alter the system’s current operation. Consequently, from a legal perspective, the proposal must be classified as declarative, with no immediate legal effects or regulatory implications.

By contrast, Álvaro Ramos’ government plan presents a more dynamic proposal regarding the SBD.

"To energize our MSMEs, secure a USD 500 million sovereign credit with multilateral banking institutions. These funds will be channeled through the Development Banking System (SBD) as a second-tier institution and allocated to six key components: working capital and investment loans, guarantees, seed capital, technical assistance, training, and, fundamentally, the articulation of productive linkages. A central element will be the figure of the ‘articulator,’ which will connect MSMEs with anchor companies, technical assistance, and financial resources, creating an integrated support ecosystem.”

From a legal standpoint, this initiative is viable within the existing legal framework, as the SBD is legally authorized to operate as a second-tier bank and manage resources from external sources. However, its implementation would need to comply with the fiscal rule and the Public Financial Administration Law. Particularly noteworthy is the explicit incorporation of the "articulator” figure, conceived as an actor responsible for connecting MSMEs with anchor companies, technical assistance services, and financing. This figure is not currently regulated under the Development Banking System Law; therefore, its implementation would require, at a minimum, clear secondary regulation and, depending on its institutional design, potentially a legal amendment defining its functions, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms.

"In the development axis, we will return to CINDE (Costa Rican Coalition of Development Initiatives) primary responsibility for attracting foreign direct investment and reinvigorate the role of Development Banking as a key instrument for implementing the national productive development strategy. In general, Costa Rica needs to place the State at the service of people.”

Third, the proposal to return primary responsibility for attracting foreign direct investment to CINDE and to reinvigorate the SBD’s role as a key instrument of national productive development introduces an element of institutional reorganization. This proposal responds to an ongoing discussion in economic circles following the transfer of functions to PROCOMER (Costa Rican Foreign Trade Promotion Agency) during the current administration. From a legal standpoint, this reassignment of competencies does not necessarily require legislative reform.

"Creation of credit lines and development banking focused on local SMEs and local infrastructure projects.”

"Strengthening the strategic role of MSMEs in Costa Rica’s economic and social development: prioritizing high-impact activities such as tourism, agribusiness, commerce, sustainability, and clean energy, with SBD-backed credit combined with mandatory business training and tax support during the first year, as well as measures to provide liquidity.”

These are generic proposals aligned with the SBD’s objectives and do not specify whether such credit lines would be operated by state-owned banks, the SBD directly, or private financial intermediaries, nor under what conditions. From a legal standpoint, this lack of specificity does not preclude feasibility but highlights the need for clear regulation. The strengthening of MSMEs through SBD-backed credit accompanied by business training and mandatory tax support during the first year can be implemented within the existing framework.

"Housing: Guarantee of Resources and Construction Pace: coordination between BANHVI and the SBD.”

Finally, the proposal for coordination between BANHVI and the SBD lacks sufficient detail to allow for legal analysis regarding its conditions and feasibility.

From a legal assessment, Álvaro Ramos’ proposals on Development Banking are solid. While some elements are declarative or general in nature, others can be implemented within the existing legal framework, and certain initiatives (such as the articulator figure and sovereign credit) would require enabling legal support.

Claudia Dobles’ proposals regarding the Development Banking System contain greater specificity and call for more substantial legal interventions.

"Accessible credit for the agricultural sector. Develop financing policies with loans backed by Development Banking System (SBD) guarantees covering between 75% and 80% of the amount granted, offering preferential interest rates capped at a maximum of 5% per annum, with flexible credit conditions designed to adapt to the nature and cycles of the agricultural sector.”

As noted in the introduction, 75% is the maximum guarantee allowed per operation -though it may reach 90% in exceptional emergency cases; therefore, absent a reform to Law No. 8634, this proposal would not be legally viable. Similarly, establishing a maximum annual interest rate cap of 5% would require additional legal reform.

"Financial innovation for export development. Establish Development Banking for Export lines focused on certifications, validations, working capital, and cold-chain/traceability assets. Create partial guarantees and factoring mechanisms backed by purchase orders from export anchor companies. Launch competitive funds to enable exporting companies to adopt international standards (ISO, HACCP, GlobalG.A.P., GMP, MDR/IVDR, SOC2/ISO 27001) and conformity assessments.”

Second, the proposal for financial innovation aimed at export development stands out for its sophistication. From a legal standpoint, these funds can be structured within the existing legal framework.

"Economic development of the province of Limón. Promote extraordinary public and private investment in the Province of Limón, particularly in areas traditionally occupied by the Afro-descendant population, generating opportunities and reducing inequality in employment and entrepreneurship relative to the country’s central regions. Promote entrepreneurship through Development Banking for Afro-descendant women. Strengthen tourism promotion campaigns through the recovery and promotion of Afro history and culture.”

This policy is associated with affirmative action measures. Legally, the SBD may target resources by region or population group; indeed, Article 8 of its law establishes equitable access to resources for women, with special conditions and policies to offset gender inequalities. Promoting entrepreneurship through the SBD for Afro-descendant women is legally viable and may be grounded in the aforementioned Article 8.

From a comprehensive legal assessment, Claudia Dobles’ proposals regarding Development Banking are characterized by a high level of instrumental specificity, particularly with respect to guarantees. Her most relevant proposals require legal reforms that must necessarily be approved by the Legislative Assembly; therefore, while legally viable, their success will depend on enabling secondary regulation.

CONCLUSIONS

The 2026 presidential elections will directly shape the development of the Costa Rican economy over the next four years; however, the transformations, reforms, adjustments, and continuities will influence the country’s future for decades. Economic issues do not rank among the top political priorities; nevertheless, when households are consulted, they consistently appear among the foremost concerns, making them central to the country’s social reality. Accordingly, a comparative Banking and Finance analysis of electoral proposals emerges as a fundamental tool for electoral, investment, and financial decision-making regarding Costa Rica’s future. Four key conclusions arise from the legal analysis.

First, there is a general convergence in recognizing the central role of the financial system as a tool for macroeconomic stability, productive development, and economic inclusion. Most initiatives fall, to varying degrees, within a continuity-based framework with gradual adjustments.

In the monetary policy and Central Bank axis, the contrast is particularly evident. Declarative and continuity-based proposals coexist with high-impact approaches, such as the adoption of a dual mandate for the Central Bank or the potential authorization of mechanisms affecting the use of international reserves. The latter must be approached with caution, as it creates constitutional tensions with the BCCR’s autonomy and runs counter to international practices.

Regarding Development Banking, the analysis highlights the instrument’s potential, albeit with clear differences in the degree of normative specificity. Some proposals replicate objectives already embedded in the SBD’s legal design without introducing new instruments or regulatory adjustments, while others propose specific interventions requiring express legal reforms to enhance the SBD’s impact.

From a cross-cutting perspective, the study confirms that not all electoral promises carry the same legal weight, nor can all be implemented through Executive Branch administrative decisions. As a product of Costa Rica’s political system, the most far-reaching initiatives—those capable of reforming the economic system—necessarily require Legislative Assembly action, the issuance of enabling secondary regulations, and inter-institutional coordination. Accordingly, the feasibility of proposals depends not only on their political or economic appeal, but on the ability to incorporate them into statutory law enacted by the Legislative Assembly, which inherently requires political consensus.

In a context of high uncertainty and increasing pressure on the financial system, Banking and Financial Law consolidates its role as a key tool for interpreting the real scope of electoral proposals and for contributing to an informed, responsible, and technically grounded public debate on Costa Rica’s economic future.

 

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